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Abstract
According to the catastrophic health expenditure methodology a house-
hold is in catastrophe if its health out-of-pocket budget share exceeds a
critical threshold. We develop a conceptual framework for addressing three
questions in relation to this methodology, namely: 1. Can a budget share
be informative about the sign of a change in welfare? 2. Is there a positive
association between a households poverty shortfall and its health out-of-
pocket budget share? 3. Does an increase in population coverage of a
health insurance scheme always result in a reduction of the prevalence of
catastrophic expenditures?
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1. Introduction
Risk averse individuals will appeal to insurance mechanisms as a means of diversi-
fying their risks. This diversication of risk is important and takes on many forms,
institutional and informal. In developing countries such as India, Townsend (1995)
nds that via informal mechanisms individuals are able to absorb some health re-
lated risks. However, for more serious and chronic illnesses, Gertler and Gruber
(2002) nd that health shocks can have a major impact on consumption and can
severely disrupt household welfare. There is similar evidence about the e¤ect of
health shocks in relation to developed countries such as the United States where
health insurance is not mandatory. There, it has been documented (cf. Feen-
berg and Skinner, 1994; Waters et al., 2004) that illness can cause households
to reallocate substantial shares of their spending to out-of-pocket (OOP) health
expenditures.
Thus it has been proposed to ascribe to a situation where health OOP expendi-
tures exceed a critical share of the households total outlay the state of catastrophic
health expenditure (Xu et al 2003; Wagsta¤ and van Doorslaer 2003). There is
no exact consensus about the critical threshold level. Some studies choose values
of 5% (Berki, 1986), 10% (Waters et al., 2004) and up to 40% of non-subsistence
spending (Xu et al., 2003).
In this growing literature, the measurement of catastrophic health care pay-
ments appears to serve three main objectives surveyed below: (i) to identify
changes in levels of well-being, (ii) to assess the extent of poverty / low levels
of living at the household level and (iii) to assess the performance of existing
health insurance schemes. There is empirical evidence regarding each of these is-
sues, though an economic conceptual framework appears to be missing. Our aim
is to try to ll this gap in the literature, by attempting to provide satisfactory
answers to the following three questions:
1. Can a budget share be informative about the sign of a change in welfare?
2. Is there a positive association between a households poverty shortfall and
its health out-of-pocket budget share?
3. Does an increase in population coverage of a health insurance scheme always
result in a reduction of the prevalence of catastrophic expenditures?
The plan of the paper is the following. Section 2 surveys the literature in
relation to the three questions stated above. The following three sections deal with
each of questions 1 to 3. The nal section contains a summary and concluding
comments.
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2. What does catastrophic expenditure aim to measure?
To date, we can distinguish three major purposes in relation to the measure-
ment of catastrophic health expenditure. First, interest in the measurement of
catastrophic health payments stems from the fact that in the absence of health
insurance, high expenditures on health care can severely disrupt household living
standards. For instance Berki (1986) states that An expenditure for medical care
becomes nancially catastrophic when it endangers the familys ability to main-
tain its customary standard of living. Ideally, this change in welfare would be
assessed with longitudinal data through examination of how health shocks disrupt
consumption paths (Gertler and Gruber, 2002; Wagsta¤, 2007). In the absence
of longitudinal data, OOP health payments in excess of a threshold budget share
have been used as a proxy for severe disruptions to household living standards.
Regarding this point, Van Doorslaer et al. (2007) write We focus on payments
that are catastrophic in the sense of severely disrupting household living stan-
dards, and approximate such payments by those absorbing a large fraction of
household resources. Thus it may be argued that a catastrophic situation may
be used to capture a change in household welfare.
Second, our reading of the literature suggests an implicit association between
the state of poverty and the state of health catastrophic expenditure. In the eco-
nomic literature on poverty, one distinguishes an ethical approach from a levels
of living approach (Atkinson, 1987). In the former, an ethical position is used
to argue that every member of society should be entitled to a minimum level of
resources. In the levels of living approach, poverty is associated with insu¢ cient
consumption resulting in a low level of welfare. We nd parallels to these two
approaches in the health payments literature. In presenting the methodology on
the measurement of catastrophic expenditure, Wagsta¤ and Van Doorslaer (2003)
write The ethical position is that no one ought to spend more than a given
fraction of income on health care 1. There are also authors who suggest that
catastrophic health expenditures are associated with low levels of living. Refer-
ring to the costs of health services, Xu et al (2003) write However accessing these
services can lead to individuals having to pay catastrophic proportions of their
available income and push many households into poverty. More explicitly, in
1The authors also propose measures of catastrophic expenditure drawing on similar tools as
in the poverty literature. This leads to By analogy with the poverty literature, one could dene
not just a catastrophic payment headcount but also a measure analogous to the poverty gap,
which we call the catastrophic payment gap.
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dening the medical poverty trap, Whitehead et al. (2001) state that Rises in
OOP costs for public and private health-care services are driving many families
into poverty, and are increasing the poverty of those who are already poor.Finally,
Flores et al. (2008) examine how households nance OOP payments (the problem
of coping with health care costs) and the implications of coping strategies for the
measurement of poverty. Clearly, in order to understand the overall relation be-
tween the incidence of poverty and catastrophic expenditure one needs to explore,
at the micro-level, the relation between the budget share Engel curve for health
OOPs and the poverty shortfall. This is what we set out to do in Section 4 below.
Catastrophic health care payments are also used to measure the performance
of prevailing health insurance schemes. The understanding is that a large fraction
of individuals experiencing catastrophic health payments is associated with an in-
su¢ cient coverage in relation to health insurance contracts. According to Waters
et al. (2004), One rationale for health insurance coverage is to provide nancial
protection against catastrophic health expenditures.By insu¢ cient coverage re-
searchers most often refer to the small percentage of the population in benet of
any health insurance scheme (Scheil-Adlung et al., 2006). But it may also refer to
the lack of generosity of the health insurance scheme, with respect to copayments
and the levels at which benets are capped. A Mexican study (Knaul et al. 2006)
concludes that the prevalence of health catastrophic expenditure is reduced by an
increased coverage of the population by health insurance schemes. Likewise a joint
ILO, WHO and OECD study covering three developing countries (Scheil-Adlung
et al., 2006) nds that membership in health insurance schemes contributes to
reducing the probability of incurring catastrophic health expenditures. Nonethe-
less this study shows that the protective e¤ect of being insured is not general: in
South Africa it only concerns the richest quintile of the population who is able
to a¤ord more comprehensive packages (Lamiraud et al., 2005). The study of
Waters et al. (2004) also reveals that low income and the occurrence of multiple
chronic conditions, alongside the lack of health insurance, increase the probability
of catastrophic health payments. These ndings are to be contrasted with those
of Wagsta¤ and Lindelow (2008) who conclude that in three Chinese provinces
health insurance increases the risk of catastrophic spending.
In the sections below we develop an economic framework for addressing the
questions stated in the Introduction in relation to this literature. We begin with
asking to what extent a budget share can be informative about a change in welfare.
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3. Catastrophic expenditure: a measure of change in wel-
fare?
When panel data on a households consumption are not available, it has been
suggested to proxy disruptions in household welfare via the use of the level of
the budget share of health OOP expenditure. Our rst question, formulated in
general terms therefore is: can a budget share be informative about the direction
of a change in household welfare?
We consider the following problem: by choice of quantities q1 and q2 of two
goods, a household maximizes its utility u(q1; q2)2 subject to a budget constraint
p1q1 + p2q2 = m: We let  denote the Lagrange multiplier, p
:
= [p1; p2]; and
we denote the consumers indirect utility function by v(m; p): In this conceptual
framework, a change in welfare arises from either a change in household income
m; a change in one or more prices, or nally a change in prices and income. The
literature most often focuses on income shocks as a source of welfare disruptions,
since these are household specic, whereas changes in prices are often perceived
to a¤ect all individuals alike.
Let m0 denote the households base period income, and let m1 denote the
households current period income. Consider then an income change m := m0 
m1 (which need not be a negative quantity). Approximating the resulting change
in welfare using a rst-order Taylor approximation, we have:
v(m0; p) ' v(m1; p) + @v
@m
(m1; p) [m0  m1] (3.1)
From the envelope theorem we have that @v
@m
(m1; p) =  > 0; since the marginal
utility of income is always positive. Letting v := v(m0; p)   v(m1; p); we can
write (3.1) in a more compact fashion as
v = m (3.2)
Since the marginal utility of income  is a positive quantity, we can state the
following preliminary result:
Lemma The change in welfare v is always of the same sign as the change
in income m:
Let wi
:
= piqi=m1 denote the budget share for good i in the current period.
Our next purpose is to write (3.1) in terms of wi: We rst use Roys identity to
write the marginal utility of income as :
2The results below easily generalize in the context of n > 2 goods.
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 =  @v=@pi
qi
(3.3)
and since qi = wim1=pi; we have that
 =  pi@v=@pi
wim1
(3.4)
Replacing (3.4) in (3.2) we have that
v =  pi@v=@pi
wim1
m (3.5)
Observe that @v=@pi < 0 (the indirect utility function is decreasing in prices), so
that, as stated in the Lemma, v > 0 if and only if m > 0: Finally, rearranging
terms, we obtain the desired relation between the budget share wi and the welfare
change v :
wi =  pi@v=@pi
m1
m
v
(3.6)
Because v has the same sign as m, a high level of the budget share wi is
equally compatible with a scenario where v  0 (for which m  0) and with
a situation such that v > 0 (corresponding to a m > 0). Accordingly, the
answer to our rst question is the following:
Proposition 1 Without additional information about the sign of the income
change, the level of a budget share cannot be informative about the sign of the
change in welfare:
The scope therefore for identifying households who experience a severe decline
in their levels of living using a budget share is limited, unless the data analyst is
sure that the household has experienced an income drop. Such information about
changes in income is however not always available in cross-section type household
surveys. The main problem is that it is hoped to identify a change in a variable
(household welfare) by means of another variable (a budget share) measured in
levels.
4. Catastrophic expenditure and poverty
We now turn to our second question, where we investigate the household level
relation between the poverty shortfall and the budget share for health OOPs. Our
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purpose here is to inquire as to the existence of a positive association between these
two variables. The answer to this question would appear to be straightforward
if we were willing to assume the existence of a decreasing Engel curve relation
between the health budget share and income. With this assumption we could
certainly conclude that catastrophic expenditure rises with poverty and thus we
could argue that to the extent that economic development reduces poverty, it
would also reduce the incidence of catastrophic expenditure.
However, the assumption of a decreasing Engel curve, or more specically of
a monotonic Engel curve is not as natural as it seems. Modern empirical research
as well as economic theory of consumer choice highlights the importance of non-
linearities in the Engel curve relation. Stated di¤erently, economic theory does
not rule out that a good could be a necessity at some income intervals and a
luxury at others. This is where we begin our investigation of our second question.
Let z denote the poverty line and dene (m; z) as a households poverty
shortfall from the poverty line 3. Because poverty measures respect the Pareto
principle (see Atkinson, 1987) the function (m; z) is monotonically decreasing in
m; for m < z and is further assumed to be zero for m  z: The function (m; z)
is thus invertible and we dene
m $ h(; z) (4.1)
to be the resulting inverse function. We also write the general Engel curve relation
for health OOP as w $  (m); where we observe once again that this relation need-
not be monotonic.
Substituting for m in the Engel curve relation using (4.1), we have
w =  [h(; z)] (4.2)
Accordingly, in the region  > 0 we have4
dw
d
=
d 
dh
@h
@
(4.3)
Because m = h(; z) is decreasing in ; the second right-hand-term is non-
positive and it follows that in (;w) space the function (4.2) will indeed have a
3That is, a poverty measure P (m; z) relates to the sum of individual family level poverty
shortfalls via the identity P (m; z) :=
R z
0
(m; z)dF; where F (m) is the distribution of income.
4At  = 0; the function h(; z) rises to innity, and accordingly the derivative
@h
@
is no longer
dened.
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positive slope for all  > 0 provided the Engel curve relation  (m) is monotoni-
cally decreasing at all income levels. In such a situation, it is the case that for any
budget share threshold dening the state of catastrophic expenditure, increases
in income will simultaneously result in a decline in the intensity of catastrophic
expenditure and poverty.
Now consider the general case where the Engel curve is non-monotonic. The
simple relation (4.3) informs us that the non-linearities in the Engel curve will
be depicted by the function (4.2). To illustrate our point, we may borrow the
specication of quadratic logarithmic demands from Banks et al. (1997) 5: In
a cross-section environment where prices are taken to be constant, the resulting
budget share relation is of the form
w(m) = 0 + 1 lnm+ 2(lnm)
2 (4.4)
where 1 and 2 are coe¢ cients that may be of opposite or identical signs. For
the individual poverty shortfall function consider the simple specication based
on Watts (1968):
(m; z) $ log(z=m) m < z (4.5)
(m; z) $ 0 m  z
The resulting relation between  and w is given by
w = 0 + 1 ln z + 2(ln z)
2   [1 + 22 ln z] + 22 (4.6)
Preliminary research by Lamiraud et al. (2008) using South African data suggests
that the Engel curve for health OOP is U shaped: Accordingly, in Figure 1 we
plot a hypothetical situation where we set 0 = 0:40; 1 =  0:80 and 2 = 0:50:
We also set the poverty line at z = 4:5; and consider a range of income values in the
interval m 2 [1; 4] pertaining to individuals experiencing poverty. The NorthEast
quadrant plots the Engel curve relation which, given the parameter values, is
U shaped, and reaches its minimum at m = exp(0:80) = 2:23: The SouthEast
5The budget shares underlying quadratic logarithmic demands are of the form
w(m; p)
:
= 0(p) + 1(p)[lnm  ln a(p)] + 2(p)[lnm  ln a(p)]2
where each of the functions 1 and 2 may either be both positive or negative over the price
space. If we abstract from price variations across family units, the resulting function w(m) is of
the form (4.4).
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quadrant plots the relation (4.5) between income and the poverty shortfall. To
obtain the relation between  and w; we draw a 45o degree line in the SouthWest
quadrant of the diagram. Finally, in the NorthWest quadrant we obtain the
desired relation (4.6). The graph illustrates in a simple fashion (4.3), that is, the
fact that the relation between w and  will reect the curvature properties of the
Engel curve.
Algebraically, the relation drawn in the NorthWest quadrant, given our choice
of functional forms and parameter values, is readily obtained from (4.6) as w =
0:33  0:7 + 0:52 such that the curve reaches its minimum at  = 0:7:
As an answer to our second question, the preceding discussion is summarized
by means of the following proposition:
Proposition 2 (a) Let the Engel curve for health out-of-pocket expenditure be
a non-monotonic function of income below the poverty line. Then the resulting
relation between the budget share and the poverty shortfall is also non-monotonic.
(b) A su¢ cient condition to obtain a positive association between the budget
share and the poverty shortfall is that the Engel curve for health OOP be a de-
creasing function of income below the poverty line.
It is therefore an empirical question to ask as to whether the Engel curve
for OOP health expenditures is indeed a declining function of income so as to
guarantee a positive association between poverty and catastrophic expenditure at
the economy-wide level.
5. Catastrophic expenditure: a measure of performance of
health insurance systems?
As discussed in Section 2, it has been advocated that the intensity of catastrophic
health care payments may be used as an index of the performance (i.e. under-
coverage) of prevailing health insurance schemes. On the other hand, the em-
pirical ndings of Wagsta¤ and Lindelow (2008) from Chinese data suggest, in
contrast to this common belief, that health insurance may increase the intensity
of catastrophic expenditure because the take-up of insurance encourages individu-
als to consume additional health resources when stricken by illness. In this section
therefore we construct a simple model for the demand of health insurance in the
developing country context in order to address our third question, namely: Does
an increase in population coverage of a health insurance scheme always result in
a reduction of the prevalence of catastrophic expenditures?
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Let  be a random variable in relation to the health state of an individual.
The variable  takes the value 1 with probability  when the individual falls ill,
and takes the value 2 in case the individual does not fall ill. Below, we mod-
ify the classic treatment of health insurance (Culyer, 1989) to take into account
several features of the decision to purchase health insurance in the developing
country context. We rstly dene the individuals preferences over two goods; a
consumption aggregate denoted C and a health care aggregate good denoted H:
Conditional on being in the health state ; the individuals utility function has a
quasi-linear form
u(C;H; ) =  lnC +H(2  ) (5.1)
such that health consumption is assumed to provide zero utility if the person is in
good health. Also, given the parameter  > 0 the marginal utility of consumption
becomes innite when C approaches zero.
The specication is relevant in the developing country context, since (5.1)
entails that individuals initially allocate their spending to the consumption good,
and upon reaching a certain threshold, start consuming the health good. To be
more specic, the consumer maximizes their ex-ante expected utility
Eu(C;H; ) = [ lnC +H] + (1  )2 lnC
= (2  ) lnC + H (5.2)
where
H  0 (5.3)
The individual may subscribe to a simplied health insurance scheme character-
ized by a premium  and a coverage d: That is, we assume that the scheme o¤ers
a capped reimbursement, in other words a 100% coverage rate for expenditure
levels up to d. Additional health expenditures above this level are however totally
paid out-of-pocket by the enrollee 6. Normalize the price of the health care good
6Note that in the context of many developing countries this assumption is quite realistic (e.g.
Gertler, 1998). In South Africa for instance, in parallel with the public heath care sector there
exists a private health sector, which users access mainly via their own funds or through private
medical insurance packages known as medical schemes. While there is a list of services that
any contract must cover, known as the Prescribed Minimum Benets [PMB], medical schemes
still have di¤ering degrees of coverage on other services not covered by PMBs. For this reason,
low cost options (mainly chosen by low income beneciaries) will not insure beneciaries from
catastrophic health expenditures, to the extent made possible by more costly options. Hence,
three quarters of low-cost options o¤ered by medical schemes to people with lower levels of
income rely on monetary limits, levies and co-payments to curb the use of top-up hospital
benets (Doherty and McLeod, 2002).
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at unity, and let Ho denote OOP health expenditures. Then H and Ho relate in
the following manner: H = Ho + d when the individual is insured, and H = Ho
in case the individual does not enroll in a health insurance plan.
If the health insurance contract is actuarially fair then ,  and d relate in
the following manner
 = d (5.4)
while the consumers budget constraint takes two distinct forms depending on
whether she / he chooses to take up health insurance. As above, we let m denote
the individuals income and let pc be the price of the consumption good. First, if
the individual does not take up health insurance, the budget constraint is given
by
pcC +H = m (5.5)
On the other hand, when the individual is insured
pcC + (H   d) = m  d (5.6)
since the person pays a premium d and receives capped benets d:
The consumers problem is whether or not to enroll in the health plan and to
determine the optimum amounts of C and H. As the purchase of health insurance
is a discrete choice good, we solve the consumers programme in two steps (Small
and Rosen, 1981). In the rst step, we solve two di¤erent problems: (i) we
maximize (5.2) over consumption C and health care H subject to (5.5) and (5.3)
when the person does not buy insurance, and (ii) we maximize (5.2) subject to
(5.6) and (5.3) when the person is insured. Let vo(m; pc) denote indirect utility
(that is, maximized expected utility) when the person does not buy insurance,
and let vI(m   d; pc) denote indirect utility when the person is insured. The
second step involves a comparison of vo(m; pc) and vI(m d; pc): the person will
choose to enroll in the health scheme if vI(m  d; pc)  vo(m; pc):
Dene A := (2   )=: As ; d and A are all exogenous parameters, the
model can be solved distinguishing two cases according to whether d is greater
or smaller than A: Here we discuss the case d < A; which can be argued to be
the more relevant case in the developing country context 7.
It is a property of quasi-linear preferences, that the consumer considers spend-
ing on H only when m  A: Thus the indirect utility function for an individual
7The assumption d < A in e¤ect means that the health insurance premium is set at a level
which is lower than the threshold at which the individual begins to consume health-care; see
below.
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who does not take up insurance is of the form
vo(m; pc)
:
= A ln

m
pc

m  A (5.7)
vo(m; pc)
:
= A ln

A
pc

+m  A m > A (5.8)
while for a person who takes up an insurance policy the indirect utility function
is of the form
vI(m  d; pc) := A ln

m  d
pc

+ d m  d  A (5.9)
vI(m  d; pc) := A ln

A
pc

+ d+m  d  A m  d > A (5.10)
From the above four equations, we note that for m  d a poor person would
never buy health insurance (the marginal utility of consumption in (5.9) is innite
at m = d:) Conversely, a rich person (m > d + A) would always buy health
insurance since the rst d units of health spending are purchased at a cost of d
(the di¤erence between (5.10) and (5.8) is positive when m > d + A:) Further-
more, there are two important income thresholds which determine the decision to
take up health insurance. First consider a person with income m^I such that
A ln

m^I
pc

= A ln

m^I   d
pc

+ d (5.11)
At m^I ; a person who does not incur health OOPs is indi¤erent between taking up
insurance or being uninsured. Clearly, for such a case to be pertinent, we must
have m^I < A: This inequality denes a rst regime of our model, which we shall
label Case I sub-model. This is the case where a person who does not subscribe
to an insurance policy will never consume health. If on the other hand m^I  A;
there exists an income threshold m^II such that
A ln

A
pc

+ m^II   A = A ln

m^II   d
pc

+ d (5.12)
where A < m^II < A+d: Under this second Case, some individuals with incomes
between A and m^II do not take up health insurance but consume health, thus
incurring OOPs. Below we refer to this second case as the Case 2 sub-model 8.
8The two regimes of the model Case I and Case II are mutually exclusive. A proof of this
result (Proposition 4) is provided in the Appendix.
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5.1. Case 1 sub-model
To spell out the e¤ect of a change in population coverage of a health insurance
scheme on the incidence of catastrophic expenditure, we rst derive the Engel
curve for OOPsHo under the Case 1 scenario. We denote this Engel curve w(m; d):
w(m; d) = 0 m < m^I (5.13)
w(m; d) = 0 m^I < m < A+ d (5.14)
w(m; d) = 1 

A+ d
m

m  A+ d (5.15)
For m < m^I , the consumer will never buy health insurance, and also does not
spend on health care. When m^I < m < A+d; the consumer buys insurance and
consumes an amountH = d: This amount is fully covered, and accordinglyHo = 0
so that in this second case w(m; d) is also equal to zero. Finally, whenm  A+d;
all additional spending on health is incurred out-of-pocket. Both relations, that
is the relation between m and H; and between m and Ho are sketched in Panel a
of Figure 2.
In Figure 3 Panel a we sketch the Engel curve for health OOPs. The graph de-
picts the implications of the Case 1 sub-model for the relation between catastrophic
expenditure and the extent of health insurance. Note that here, catastrophic ex-
penditure (a budget share in excess of some arbitrary threshold w(z; d)) only occur
when m > A+ d: The share of the population insured is 1  F (m^I) where F (:)
is the cumulative distribution of income. Solving for m^I in (5.11) we have that
m^I =
exp(d=A)  d
exp(d=A)  1 (5.16)
In turn this implies that @m^I=@d > 0; that is the share of the population covered
by the health insurance scheme decreases when d is larger. On the other hand
@w=@d = 0 when m < A + d and @w=@d < 0 when m  A + d: That is;
while there is a resulting decrease in the share of the population covered via an
increase in d; the incidence of catastrophic expenditure is reduced. The Case 1 sub-
model therefore provides a counter-example to the hypothesis that catastrophic
expenditures are associated with an insu¢ cient population coverage of a given
health insurance scheme.
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5.2. Case 2 sub-model
Unlike the Case I sub-model where OOP expenditure is only incurred by the rich
(m > A + d), the Case 2 sub-model where individuals may be incurring health
expenditures without being insured, presents a more varied conguration of OOPs
by income groups. For m < A, the consumer allocates the total amount of her
budget to C and does not spend on health. Accordingly, both H and Ho are
equal to zero. For A < m < m^II , the consumer does not take up insurance, but
spends m   A on health. Therefore, both H and Ho are equal to m   A. For
m^II < m < A + d, the individual chooses to buy insurance and consumes the
amount H = d which is fully reimbursed by the insurance scheme. Hence in this
case also Ho is equal to zero. Finally, for m > A+ d, H = m  A  d+ d. All
expenditures then are nanced out-of-pocket. We sketch the resulting relations
between m; H and Ho in Panel b of Figure 2. The related health OOP budget
shares are readily derived as follows:
w(m; d) = 0 m < A (5.17)
w(m; d) = 1 

A
m

A < m < m^II (5.18)
w(m; d) = 0 m^II < m < A+ d (5.19)
w(m; d) = 1 

A+ d
m

m  A+ d (5.20)
We may note from Panel b of Figure 3 that catastrophic expenditure may now
concern two population groups: those with resources m 2 (A; m^II) (who do not
purchase health insurance) and those for which m  A+ d:
For the latter group, an increase in d (and hence a decrease in the share of the
population covered) results in a decline of catastrophic health expenditure (as was
the case in the Case 1 sub-model.) On the other hand, we show in Proposition
5 of the Appendix that the e¤ect of an increase in d on m^II is ambiguous. Con-
sequently, the e¤ect of a change in d on the share 1   F (m^II) of the population
which is insured is also undetermined.
If the overall e¤ect of an increase in d is that m^II is increased, the incidence of
catastrophic expenditure rises for individuals in the income range A < m < m^II ;
while it still falls for individuals with the higher incomes m  A + d. Thus
an increase in the share of the population covered would result in an ambiguous
overall e¤ect on the incidence of catastrophic expenditures.
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5.3. Change in population coverage: overall e¤ect
The Case I sub-model entails that the incidence of catastrophic expenditure is
reduced when population coverage of the heath insurance scheme declines, and
conversely that increased coverage increases the incidence of catastrophic expen-
diture. The Case II sub-model generates catastrophic expenditures for both the
insured and uninsured populations. For this reason, there the overall e¤ect of a
change in population coverage on the incidence of catastrophic expenditure is am-
biguous. We may summarize our above discussion with the following Proposition:
Proposition 3 (a) Under the case I sub-model (m^I < A), a reduction in the
share of the population insured results in a decline in the incidence of catastrophic
expenditure.
(b) Under the case II sub-model (m^I > A), a reduction in the share of the
population insured has an undetermined e¤ect on the incidence of catastrophic
expenditure.
6. Concluding comments
We may summarize our answers to the three questions raised in the paper as
follows:
1. An observed budget share level for a given good is compatible with both
a drop or a rise in levels of living. Thus, without additional information about
the direction of income change, the level of a budget share cannot be informative
about the sign of the change in welfare.
2. In the general case where below the poverty line the Engel curve for OOPs
is a non-monotonic function of income, the resulting relation between the budget
share and the poverty shortfall is also non-monotonic. However, if below the
poverty line the income elasticity for OOPs is smaller than one (i.e. the Engel
curve is decreasing), this will indeed entail a positive association between the
poverty shortfall and the budget share for health OOPs.
3. An increase in population coverage of a health insurance scheme need not
always result in a reduction of the prevalence of catastrophic expenditures.
In relation to our rst question, we may conclude therefore that the scope for
using cross-section data to identify households who experience a severe decline
in their levels of living using a budget share is considerably limited, unless the
data analyst is sure that the household has experienced an income drop. Such
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information about changes in income is readily available from panel data, but is
rarely encountered in cross-section type household surveys.
We note from our discussion in relation to the second question that we have
addressed in the paper, that it does not follow that catastrophic health expendi-
ture increases with poverty. Empirical work is therefore needed in order to further
explore the curvature properties of the Engel curve for health care spending.
Finally, with the help of a simple model, we have shown that catastrophic
expenditure could well decline when the share of the population covered by a
health insurance scheme also falls. Thus, more work is needed in order to better
understand how the overall performance of a health insurance scheme relates to
the incidence of catastrophic expenditures.
7. Appendix
This appendix gathers proofs of two results stated in the paper.
Proposition 4 There exists m^II 2 [A; A + d] such that for any m  m^II
the consumer always chooses to buy insurance.
Proof : Dene m^I by the equality
A ln

m^I
pc

= A ln

m^I   d
pc

+ d
This yields m^I =
exp(d=A)  d
exp(d=A)  1 : Now, if m^I < A, the consumer switches to
insurance at an income level m in the interval [d ; A], and m^II = A. If m^I > A,
then at m = A,
A ln

m
pc

+m  A > A ln

m  d
pc

+ d
i.e. vo (m; pc) > vI (m  d; pc). Also, atm = d+A, vI (m  d; pc) vo (m; pc) =
d  d > 0.
Since the indirect utility function is continuous in m, there must exist an m^II
in the interval [A;A+ d] such that vo (m^II ; pc) = vI (m^II   d; pc).
Proposition 5 The e¤ect of a change in d on m^II is undetermined.
Dene G (m^II ; d) = A lnA + m^II  A   A ln (m^II   d)   d. By denition,
G (m^II ; d) = 0. Let  x denote an innitesimal change in x. It follows from the
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implicit function theorem that
m^II
d
=
@G=@d
 @G=@m^II =
d+ A  m^II
d+ A  m^II
The denominator of this last ratio is positive in virtue of Proposition 5. However
the numerator of the ratio has an undetermined sign. Thus, the sign of m^II= d
is undetermined.
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Figure 1: Relationship between health care budget share and poverty shortfall 
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Figure 2: Health care consumption in Case 1 and Case 2 submodels   
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 Figure 3: Engel curves for OOP spending in Case 1 and Case 2 submodels  
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